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ABSTRACT 
 Over time, organized religion has impacted many aspects of societies across the globe. In 
this study, I focus on the island of Ireland – a clear case study with a history of sectarian 
religious divides that play out in a democratic society. Through my analysis I find that religion 
has operated quite differently on both sides of the Irish border as it relates to public opinion on 
abortion, sexuality, and gender roles. Specifically, there are striking cross-national differences 
regarding the importance of religious group identity compared to levels of personal religiosity in 
shaping public opinion on the issues studied.  
To examine the relationship between religious group, personal religiosity, and social 
attitudes (including abortion rights, LGBTQ+ issues, and gender roles in family), I use 
International Social Survey Programme Religion data from 1991 and 2008 to conduct bivariate 
and multivariate statistical models. This analysis reveals three major trends. First, both religious 
group identity and personal religiosity matter a great deal in Northern Ireland as it relates to 
social attitudes. Additionally, over time the religiously unaffiliated in the North have emerged as 
a cohesive and politically distinct group that organizes around liberal social and political values. 
Lastly, in the Republic, personal religiosity is more influential than religious group identification 
in determining social values on abortion, same-sex marriage, and gender roles. Subsequent  
qualitative case studies suggest that modern-day rhetoric from religious elites, politicians, and 







Throughout history, organized religion has maintained a strong influence over issues of 
social and moral importance across the globe. My younger brother is the product of in vitro 
fertilization and as a child I remember hearing about a devout Pentecostal man my father worked 
with who told him taking creation out of God’s hands is a sin. In my view, in vitro fertilization 
and abortion politics in the church are two sides of the same coin regarding women’s autonomy 
in reproduction. Through this project, I hope to better understand the ways organized religion 
and religious elite rhetoric impact individual views on women’s right to control their own 
reproduction and the policy implications of these views in democratic societies. To study the 
relationship between organized religion and gendered social politics, I focus on the island of 
Ireland, which is a clear case study of sectarian, religious divides that play out in democratic 
societies. 
By seeking to better understand the impact that religious institutions can have on 
women’s autonomy issues in cross-national contexts, this study will contribute to the larger 
conversation surrounding the factors that shape public opinion on women’s rights. Most existing 
research related to religious institutions in Ireland focuses strictly on either Catholicism or 
Protestantism. Some researchers seek to understand how the political influence of the Church 
and religious identity has changed over time in Ireland (Buckley, 2016; Inglis, 2007; Inglis, 
2017); meanwhile, other scholars directly analyze the positions Irish religious institutions take on 
abortion politics (Bloomer and Pierson 2017; Bloomer et al. 2019; Dillon 1996; Jelen and 
Wilcox 2002). Still, other researchers compare the Irish national contexts to trends of abortion 
politics in other Western nations (Jelen and Wilcox 1998; Randall 1992).  
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No Irish-specific study explores the interplay between abortion and gender role attitudes 
under the umbrella of gender equality, though Amy Adamczyk has explored this relationship in 
an international context using World Values Survey data (Adamczyk, 2013). Another 1998 study 
by Ted Jelen and Clyde Wilcox uses the World Values Survey to explore political socialization 
among Catholics in Western Europe. They study the dissemination of “traditional Catholic 
values”, including attitudes on abortion and (to a lesser extent) gendered family values (Jelen & 
Wilcox, 1998). My thesis will build on this smaller body of research that views abortion and 
gendered family roles as functions of a larger conversation of women’s equality and autonomy. 
Additionally, few studies compare Catholic and Protestant opinions, even in intranational 
Irish contexts. Mick Cunningham uses “Family and Changing Gender Roles” ISSP data to hone 
in on Northern Irish attitudes on gender and family roles around the time of the Good Friday 
agreement (Cunningham, 2017). My thesis is inspired, in part, by his comparison between 
religious groups and will expand this framework of comparison to a larger Irish context by 
including the Republic of Ireland in my cross-denominal analysis.  
My thesis uniquely compares the religious contexts of Northern Ireland and the Republic 
of Ireland using ISSP “Religion” data from 1991 and 2008, as well as modern day case studies to 
think about old questions related to gender and religion. To explore the intersection of religion, 
gender, and politics in Ireland, I will look at how religious group identity and personal religiosity 
measures impact individual opinions on gendered social issues. These issues include abortion, 
same sex relationships, and gender roles in marriage. I have chosen this set of issues because I 
view them as related under the umbrella of gender politics and women’s autonomy, an area of 
which “the Church” has a lot to say. This work is distinct to existing literature in that it accounts 
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for all major religious groups on the island of Ireland, including the religiously unaffiliated, 
while analyzing these groups in a cross-national context over time.  
The next section will expand on the major religious groups present on both sides of the 
Irish border and how these groups have changed over time. After this, I will provide an overview 
of the legal frameworks regarding abortion access, same-sex marriage, and gender roles in 
family on both sides of the border. Next, I will highlight three theories best supported by the 
literature that seek to explain which aspect of religion is most impactful in shaping public 
opinion. Then, I will detail my quantitative research methods and discuss the theories best 
supported by my statistical analysis. Finally, I will expand on the major quantitative findings by 
examining how religion has contributed to the most recent gendered policy debates on both sides 





Religious identity is both a social and personal concept, especially in societies with 
charged historical contexts around religion (Inglis, 2007, p. 119). Scholars have noted global 
trends regarding the decline of Catholic religious affiliation and the rise of the religiously 
unaffiliated as a demographic (Inglis, 2007; Buckley, 2016; Wald and Calhoun-Brown, 2018). 
These trends are also evidenced in Northern Ireland and the Republic.  
 In his work, Tom Inglis lays out multiple plausible explanations for the decline in 
affiliation with the Catholic Church, including “increase in liberal, individualist behavior 
associated with sexuality, the media, and consumer capitalism in general” (2007, p. 191). 
Further, David Buckley describes other reasons for this decline, such as the deteriorating 
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credibility of the Catholic Church amidst a history of sexual abuse scandals and cover ups 
(Buckley, 2016, p. 62). Meanwhile, the religious landscapes in both the Republic of Ireland and 
Northern Ireland are changing to accommodate increasing religious and ethnic diversity 
(Buckley, 2016, p. 63-64).  
 Similarly, global trends regarding the religiously unaffiliated can be seen on both sides of 
the Irish border. 1991 marked the first time an option to select “none” was included on the 
religious demographics section of the Northern Ireland census. In that year, 11 percent of the 
population chose either “None” or didn’t answer the religious demographic census question 
(Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency (NISO), 1991).  
 
Northern Ireland 
         Northern Ireland has a Protestant plurality among its population, with 42% of 
respondents to the 2011 Census identifying as “Protestant or Other Christian” (NISO, 2011). The 
Protestant proportion of the population has shrunk over time; meanwhile, the Catholic population 
has grown at a steady rate since the 1981 Census and now makes up a sizable population in the 
North (Britannica, 2021). The last census in Northern Ireland took place in 2011, and another is 
set to occur in 2021. News outlets, such as BBC, speculate that the next wave of census data may 
show Catholics outnumbering Protestants in the province (Gordon, 2018). These demographic 
changes could tip the political scale, as more Catholics tend to identify with left wing political 
parties than Protestants (Cunningham, 2017). More importantly, under the Good Friday 
Agreement, a majority vote could reunite Northern Ireland with the Republic (Education Service 
Northern Ireland Assembly, 2021). Because of this provision, a Catholic majority could have 
great political ramifications for the North.  
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         Many denominations make up the Northern Irish Protestant plurality (Inglis, 2007, p. 
118). Specifically, Presbyterians are the largest denomination within the Protestant category in 
Northern Ireland. Still, many others in the North are Anglican, with the Church of Ireland 
serving as the largest Anglican Churches on both sides of the Irish border (Church of Ireland, 
2021). The Northern Ireland Census has categorized the most prevalent Protestant denominations 
differently over time. In 2001, Protestant categories were broken up into: “Presbyterian, Church 
of Ireland, Methodist, and Other Christian”. Only 0.82 percent of respondents chose “other 
religion or philosophy” in 2001 – up from 0.3% (or less than 5,100) of respondents in 2001 
(NISO, 2001; NISO, 2011). It seems that, prior to 2001, “other denominations” served as a 
blanket category for both “other” Christian and non-Christian denominations, making it difficult 
to determine the prevalence of non-Christian populations in Northern Ireland prior to 2001 
within Census data (NISO, 2021). Figure 1 provides a visual of the changes to the Protestant, 















Republic of Ireland 
 There is much less religious diversity in the Republic of Ireland when compared to the 
North. In the Republic, the vast majority of the population is Catholic (Inglis 2007, p. 118). In 
2016, Catholics made up for nearly 80 percent of the total Irish population, which was down 
about five percent from 2011 (Central Statistics Office, 2016). The Republic of Ireland’s Central 
Statistics Office (CSO) indicates that the Catholic population in the Republic hit a peak of over 
94 percent in the 1960’s. Since then, the Catholic population has slowly declined (Central 
Statistics Office, 2016). In 2016, the CSO report indicates that the religiously unaffiliated 
population grew by nearly 200,000 persons, making it the second largest religious group.  
                                               
1 Data from Census Reports (1981-2011). Retrieved from Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency. 
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Protestants are mostly concentrated in the Church of Ireland or Presbyterian Church and 
make up less than five percent of the Republic according to the 2016 Census (Central Statistics 
Office, 2016). While Protestants are categorized by denomination, personal religiosity is the 
main point of diversity within the Catholic population. Inglis expands on this point in his work 
by discussing the prevalence of individuals who identify with a religious group while their 
religious behaviours and practices remain nominal (Inglis, 2007, p. 117).  
The Irish Catholic Bishops’ Conference notes that, while survey measures of religiosity 
are highly debated, great variance can be seen within the English Values Study data regarding 
levels of religiosity among Catholics. In their report, they analyze survey data from the fourth 
wave, which took place in 2008 (O’Mahony, 2010, p. 2). In their data analysis, the Council for 
Research and Development notes that the proportion of Catholics on the Island attending Mass 
weekly or more has fallen over time, from over 80 percent in the 1970’s to less than half of the 
Catholic population at the time of the 2010 report (O’Mahony, 2010, p. 5). The report also finds 
that Northern Irish Catholics attend church more often than those in the Republic (O’Mahony, 
2010, p. ). This report, derived from English Values Study data, signifies the existence of 
nominal Catholics who identify with the religion but do not practice conventional indicators of 
their faith on a regular basis (such as attending Mass and praying regularly).  
 
  
The Legal Framework 
 This section will provide an overview of the relevant policy background in both Northern 
Ireland and the Republic on abortion, LBGTQ+ issues, and issues related to gender roles in the 
law. Religious groups in Ireland have mobilized on each issue at different points in time, as each 
topic relates to the traditional social values often held by Protestants and Catholics alike. In their 
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piece, Smyth links sexuality and reproductive freedom under the same moral umbrella, which 
play out in nationalist politics and discourse (Smyth, 2006, p. 654). In debates surrounding 
abortion, LGBT+ rights, and gender roles, churches have played a role in shaping public opinion 
as well as the policy landscape (Smyth, 2006).  
 In short, political changes in Northern Ireland around abortion and LGBTQ+ issues have 
progressed in recent years; however these legal changes have stemmed from legislation passed in 
the United Kingdom as opposed to the Northern Irish Assembly. On the other hand, Northern 
Ireland has enjoyed less progress relating to gender roles in family. In fact, Brexit has caused 
substantial anxiety regarding the potential for regression on issues such as equal pay and non-
discrimination measures for pregnant individuals which are protected under European Union 
measures. Meanwhile, changes to abortion and same-sex marriage in the Republic of Ireland 
have been achieved through multiple referendums to amend the Constitution. Despite these more 
direct and fundamental constitutional changes on abortion and LGBTQ+ issues, the Republic has 
also experienced slower progress as it relates to gender roles in family.  
 






Prior to 2019, abortion was heavily restricted in Northern Ireland in ways unique from 
the rest of the United Kingdom, as key pieces of abortion legislation reform in the U.K. did not 
apply to Northern Ireland.2 The key basis for Northern Ireland’s abortion laws was Sections 58 
                                               
2 Conservative unionists were adamant in every other regard that Northern Ireland be treated no differently than the 
rest of the United Kingdom; however, when it came to abortion policy, unionists advocated against adopting 
liberalized abortion policy from the UK.  
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and 59 of the 1861 Offences Against The Person Act. Section 58 made “attempts to procure an 
abortion” a felony; meanwhile, Section 59 classifies any attempt to aid a woman seeking an 
abortion or intentional miscarriage as a misdemeanor (UK Parliament, 1861). The Offences 
Against The Person Act left no room for exceptions or exemptions related to cases of rape, 
incest, or medical necessity. 
         In 1967, England, Scotland, and Wales amended their abortion laws through the Abortion 
Act 1967 to provide for circumstances in which a legal abortion could be obtained. The 1967 
provisions for legal abortions include risk to the pregnant woman’s mental and physical health as 
well as risk that the child would be born with significant disabilities (UK Parliament, 1967). The 
Abortion Act 1967 did not apply to Northern Ireland, and so abortions remained illegal in the 
province; however, many women from Northern Ireland traveled to England, Scotland, and 
Wales to access abortion services prior to the decriminalization of abortion in 2019 (Boyle & 
McEvoy, p. 283). 
 
Decriminalization of Abortion 
In October 2019, the UK Parliament decriminalized abortion in Northern Ireland with the 
passage of the Northern Ireland (Executive Formation etc.) Act (Rough, 2020; UK Parliament, 
2019). Though abortion was decriminalized in Northern Ireland, it is important to note that this 
did not take place through the Northern Irish Assembly. Instead, this Act was an action from the 
Parliament of the United Kingdom that provided deadlines related to the formation of a Northern 
Irish Executive after the Assembly collapsed in 2017 (Torrance, 2019). If no executive was put 
into place by October 21, 2019, the Act would automatically go into effect the following day 
(Rough, 2020). 
 12 
         No Northern Irish executive was formed by the deadline and so abortion was 
decriminalized by the Act on October 22, 2019 (Rough, 2020; UK Parliament, 2019). 
Specifically, Section 9 of the Northern Ireland Act repealed sections 58 and 59 of the Offences 
Against the Person Act, which had made procuring an abortion a felony in Northern Ireland since 
its passage in 1861 (UK Parliament, 1861; UK Parliament, 2019). The 2019 abortion regulations 
were later repackaged due to drafting errors and passed again as “Abortion (Northern Ireland) 
(No. 2) Regulations 2020” in June 2020, resulting in minor technical changes (Rough, 2020). 
The Executive Formation Bill is responsible for other social change in Northern Ireland, such as 
the legalization of same-sex marriage, which will be expanded on in “An Overview of LGBTQ+ 
Policy: Northern Ireland”.   
 
Republic of Ireland 
 
Early Policy 
Section 58 and 59 of the Offences Against the Person Act of 1861 also provided the 
original basis for abortion laws in the Republic of Ireland. Though this Act was passed well 
before the Republic of Ireland was declared independent from the U.K. in 1919, it was one of 
many U.K. laws that persisted in the Republic of Ireland  after gaining independence (Burrell & 
Griffiths, 2017); however, unlike Northern Ireland, most legal changes regarding abortion in the 
Republic of Ireland have taken place via referendums on constitutional amendments. 
The laws surrounding abortion in the Republic of Ireland remained unchanged until the 8th 
Amendment Referendum which passed with a two-thirds majority vote in 1983 (Gilmartin & 
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White, 2001, p. 276).3 This amendment legally established an equal “right to life” for both 
mother and child and treats any fetus as a person under law (De Londras & Máiréad, 2018, pg. 2; 
Hillard, 2016; Nugent, 2018). De Londras, Máiréad, and other scholars discuss the 1983 8th 
Amendment referendum as a movement influenced by conservative and religious forces in 
response to women’s liberation movements around the world. Notably, both the United States 
and the United Kingdom liberalized their abortion laws during the 1960’s and 70’s via Roe v. 
Wade and the Abortion Act of 1967 respectively (De Londras & Máiréad, 2018, pg. 3; Nugent, 
2018). 
  
Abortion Tourism & The X Case 
Just like in Northern Ireland, there were many documented cases of women traveling 
from the Republic to the United Kingdom to receive abortions prior to the liberalization of 
abortions laws (Barry, 1998; Lentin, 2013, p. 132). Gilmartin and White refer to this trend as 
“abortion tourism” (pg. 276); meanwhile, Lentin estimates that over 150,000 women with 
addresses in the Republic of Ireland traveled to Britain to access abortion services between 1980 
and 2011 (Lentin, 2013, p. 132). 
One of the most famous examples of “abortion tourism” in the Republic of Ireland was 
“The X Case”, which was tried before the Irish Supreme Court in 1992 (Gilmartin & White, 
2001; Lentin, 2013, p. 132). The case centered around a 14-year old girl who was impregnated 
by her rapist and was prevented from traveling to Britain for an abortion, despite a significant 
risk of suicide. The Supreme Court ruled in the girl’s favor, recognizing the risk a forced 
                                               
3 Because the 8th Amendment was passed, it necessitated that future changes to abortion policy would have to come 
through a constitutional amendment. Some scholars posit that this was a strategic move by the pro-life movement in 
the Republic to make it more difficult to change abortion laws (Carnegie & Roth, 2019).  
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pregnancy posed to her mental health. This precedent established the right to travel for abortion 
access (Gilmartin & White, 2001, p. 277; Lentin, 2013, p. 132). The Court again upheld this 
precedent in 2007 when the “D Case” came before the Court, with similar facts regarding a 
seventeen-year-old’s right to travel for an abortion (Gilmartin & White, 2001, p. 277). 
The right to travel, or “abortion tourism”, became a specific inflection point in the 
discourse surrounding abortion access in Ireland, leading to the Thirteenth and Fourteenth 
Amendment of the Constitution Acts in 1992. The Thirteenth Amendment Act changes the 
Eighth Amendment, also referred to as Article 40.3 of the Constitution, to clarify and reinforce 
the freedom to engage in interstate travel for abortion access (Ireland, 1945). Meanwhile, the 
Fourteenth Amendment Act of 1992 amends Article 40.3, protects the right to obtain information 
about legal abortion services available in another state (House of the Oireachtas, 1992).4 
Though the right to travel for an abortion is guaranteed by the Irish Constitution, 
Gilmartin and White rightfully critique the equitability of this option. While all Irish women 
have the right to travel to receive an abortion, this “solution” is unattainable for those without the 
socioeconomic means to afford substantial expenses associated with travel. Further, race and 
nationality prevent other women from accessing safe and legal abortion via travel due to 
complicated laws and visa processes (Gilmartin & White, 2001, pg. 278). Without equitable, 
safe, and legal access to abortion, women who are marginalized on the basis of class, nationality, 
or race are more likely to pursue dangerous alternatives. 
 
 
                                               
4 Notably, the passage of the 15th Amendment happened around the same time, which legalized divorce in the 
Republic. Many of the same groups mobilized against the passage of this Amendment (for more information, see 
Barry, 1998).  
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Protection of Life During Pregnancy Act 
         Despite the vast political mobilization around abortion access in the 1990’s, little 
legislative change occurred for two decades. The issue of abortion access was brought back to 
the forefront of Irish politics with the wrongful death of Savita Halappanavar in 
2012.  Halappanavar was a migrant woman who sought medical attention for a miscarriage in 
Galway at seventeen weeks of pregnancy. Though it was clear she would die due to her medical 
complications, she was repeatedly denied termination of her pregnancy because Ireland is a 
“Catholic country” and a fetal heartbeat was still detectable (Lentin, 2013, p. 130). Ronit Lentin 
describes the intersectionality of this tragedy best by saying, “beyond being a woman who 
unnecessarily died in childbirth in Ireland’s post-Catholic patriarchy, Halappanavar was a 
migrant woman, whose death requires theorizing the Republic of Ireland as a gendered racial 
state” (Lentin, 2013, p. 130). 
Savita’s entirely avoidable and wrongful death demonstrated yet again the serious 
consequences of Ireland’s regressive abortion policies. Less than a year later, the Protection of 
Life During Pregnancy Act (PLDPA) was passed to allow for termination of pregnancy if 
multiple doctors agreed it was necessary to protect the mother’s life, including risk of suicide; 
however, the Act did not make additional exceptions for “rape, incest or fatal fetal 
abnormalities” (Burrell & Griffiths, 2017; Carnegie & Roth, 2019). 
The PLPDA was largely ineffective and, according to the Irish Department of Health, 
less than thirty abortions have been carried out under the parameters of the act per year since its 
passage (Carnegie & Roth, 2019, p. 112). Multiple United Nations committees took issue with 
these small changes to Ireland’s abortion policies. Most notably, The UN Committee on 
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Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights indicated possible human rights violations in the Republic 
and called for the repeal of the Eighth Amendment in 2015 (Hillard, 2016). 
 
Repealing the 8th Amendment 
         In 2016, the Oireachtas, or the legislature of Ireland, voted to create an impartial 
Citizen’s Assembly to discuss a range of issues including the Eighth Amendment (Carnegie & 
Roth, 2019, p. 113). Interests groups participated heavily in the discourse around the Eighth 
Amendment, including the Abortion Rights Campaign (ARC). The ARC helped provide first-
hand narratives of women who had been harmed by Ireland’s regressive abortion policies. 
Despite skepticism among some pro-choice groups, the Citizen’s Assembly sided with change 
and urged for a referendum on the Eighth Amendment (Carnegie & Roth, 2019, p. 114). In May, 
2018, the Eighth Amendment was repealed by a 2-to-1 vote and the new legislation was signed 
by the President in December, 2018 (Carnegie & Roth, 2019, p. 115). 
Today, abortion is available and free in Ireland during the first trimester of pregnancy 
(Carnegie & Roth, 2019, p. 116); however, Carnegie and Roth note that abortion is still 
criminalized by Irish law. The new legislation merely identifies acceptable instances in which an 
exception can be granted (Carnegie & Roth, 2019, p. 117). The authors worry that this 
“criminalization framework” unnecessarily burdens women seeking abortions, as well as 
healthcare providers, and opens the door for anti-choice movements to interfere with a woman’s 





                                               
5 Irish legislation exclusively uses “Termination of Pregnancy” to refer to abortion services; however, throughout 
this piece, I use those terms interchangeably. 
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An Overview of LGBTQ+ Policy 
Northern Ireland 
 Though the 1998 Northern Ireland Agreement included specific language regarding the 
promotion of “equality of opportunity” related to identity factors including sexuality, progress 
has been slow for the LGBT community in Northern Ireland (Northern Ireland Office, 1998, p. 
20).  In 1967, private homosexual acts among adults were decriminalized in England and Wales 
via the Sexual Offences Act; Meanwhile, Northern Ireland did not change their laws to match 
until fifteen years later (UK Parliament, 2021). Livingston posits that this slow progress was due 
in part to Northern Ireland’s preoccupation with political and religious cleavages taking place at 
the time (Livingston, 2003, p. 1210). Northern Ireland’s history of conflict resulted in a post-
agreement fixation with national and religious identity that made progress for other identity 
groups, such as LGBTQ+ individuals, a low priority issue for many leaders (Livingston, 2003).  
Still, numerous groups mobilized around equality for Northern Ireland’s LGBTQ+ 
community before and after the Troubles (Livingston, 2003). The Northern Ireland Gay Rights 
Association was formed in 1975, and began petitioning for the repeal of the Offences Against the 
Person Act of 1861 as well as the Criminal Law Amendment Act of 1855 (Livingston, 2003, p. 
1215). Both Acts criminalized homosexual activity until gay sex was legalized by the European 
Court of Human Rights in 1981 (Livingston, 2003; Savage, 2019).6 After the decriminalization 
of gay sexual intimacy, the next policy push focused on civil partnerships and same-sex 
marriage.  
The Civil Partnership Act 2004 was passed by the UK Parliament and made applicable to 
Northern Ireland through Part 4 of the Act (UK Parliament, 2004). This Act allowed for the legal 
                                               
6 Notably, gay sex was decriminalized in the rest of the United Kingdom over a decade prior (Savage, 2019).  
 18 
recognition of same-sex partnerships. Interestingly, Part 4 of the Act bars religious services from 
being used during the officiating of a civil partnership (UK Parliament, 2004). This Act marked 
great progress for LGBT rights; however marriage equality remained the ultimate goal.  
Initially, no Northern Irish political party supported same-sex marriage; however, Sinn 
Fein, Northern Ireland’s left wing revolutionist party, incorporated marriage equality as a policy 
platform beginning in 2012. The party also introduced a motion to the Northern Ireland 
Assembly to legalize same-sex marriage that same year (Savage, 2019). 7 The incorporation of 
same-sex marriage in the Sinn Fein platform was a big step for the LGBTQ+ movement in the 
North. On the other hand, the Democratic Unionist Party has stood firmly against the legalization 
of same-sex marriage. Notably the Democratic Unionist Party was founded by Ian Paisley Sr. in 
1971, the same man who founded the Free Presbyterian Church decades earlier (Savage, 2019).8  
Between 2012 and 2015, the Northern Ireland Assembly voted on same-sex marriage five 
times. On the fifth vote, a majority was reached in favor of the measure; however, the 
Democratic Unionist Party vetoed it via a “petition of concern” (BBC News, 2015). The House 
of Commons Library Briefing Paper on marriage of same sex couples in Northern Ireland notes 
that multiple bills were proposed after the measure was blocked by the DUP in 2015; however, 
no real progress was made until the Northern Ireland (Executive Formation) Act passed in 
Westminster in 2019 (Fairbairn, 2020).  
This legislation essentially forced Northern Ireland’s hand on multiple issues, including 
abortion rights and same-sex marriage equality. Ian Paisley Jr. spoke out against the Bill and 
many other legislators took issue with such legislation coming from Westminster, as opposed to 
                                               
7 The incorporation of this platform also contributed to the longstanding tension between Sinn Fein and the Catholic 
Church (Sinn Fein, 2014; Savage, 2019). 
8 Ironically, the Democratic Unionist Party and Free Presbyterian Church clashed in 2019 over the party’s selection 
of an openly gay candidate, Alison Bennington (Manley, 2019).  
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the Northern Irish Assembly (Fairbairn, 2020). Nonetheless, the bill was passed and no Northern 
Irish executive was formed by the deadline set (Fairbairn, 2020; Torrance, 2019). As a result, the 
Executive Formation Act went into effect on October 22, 2019. Section 8 of the Act required 
Northern Ireland’s Secretary of State to make changes to allow for legal same-sex marriage “on 
or before 13 January 2020” (Fairbairn, 2020, p. 3); thus, same-sex marriage has been legal in 
Northern Ireland for over a year at this point in time.  
 
Ireland 
 While the Republic of Ireland took longer to decriminalize gay sex than Northern Ireland, 
marriage equality in the Republic occurred years prior to the change in the North. The Republic 
of Ireland criminalized homosexual sodomy until 1993 and same-sex relationships were not 
legally recognized until the passage of the Civil Partnership and Certain Rights and Obligations 
of Cohabitants Acts in 2010 (Dunne, 2015, p. 77). Still, civil partnerships differed from marriage 
in many important ways. Most notably, same-sex partners were not able to adopt children 
together, only separately (Dunne, 2015). Even after policies surrounding same-sex relationships 
liberalized in the 2010’s, employment legislation from earlier eras persist, allowing LGBT 
individuals to be discriminated against if medical or employment institutions disagree with their 
identity on a religious basis (Dunne, 2015).   
In 2015, Ireland made history as the first country to adopt same-sex marriage equality by 
referendum (Caollaí & Hilliard, 2015). The referendum came as a result of the Irish 
Constitutional Convention, which met many times between 2013 and 2014 to discuss a myriad of 
issues facing Ireland (The Convention on the Constitution, 2014). Same-sex marriage was one of 
many topics discussed at the Convention. In their final report, the members of the Convention 
 20 
recommended a constitutional amendment to provide for same-sex marriage equality (The 
Convention on the Constitution, 2014).  
This referendum took place on May 22, 2015 and passed with 62.1% of voters supporting 
the measure (Amnesty International UK, 2015). The thirty-fourth Amendment to the 
Constitution, otherwise known as The Marriage Act of 2015, followed the referendum and made 
the will of the people law. Section 4 of The Marriage Act 2015 amended the Civil Registration 
Act of 2004, which prohibited same-sex partners to marry (House of the Oireachtas, 2015). The 
Marriage Act also includes provisions protecting religious institutions from having to officiate 
marriage ceremonies to which they don’t agree (McGee, 2015).  
 
 
An Overview of Gender Roles in Law 
Northern Ireland 
 In Northern Ireland, women still face significant legal barriers to true equality in society. 
According to the Women’s Resource and Development Agency, most of these legal barriers 
reside in the area of women’s employment and gender pay equity (Powell, 2020). This trend is 
additionally evidenced by the Economic Justice Pillar of the Northern Ireland Women’s 
Manifesto, drafted by international partners who make up the Women’s Policy Group (WPG) 
(WPG, 2019). According to the Women’s Resource and Development Agency (WRDA), the 
labour-markets in Northern Ireland are still highly segregated by gender (Powell, 2020). This 
gender segregation is harmful to women’s equality because it reinforces the notion that women 
should be doing certain kinds of labour – typically low paying service and hospitality positions 
involving significant emotional labor (Powell, 2020). Additionally, this gender sorting says a lot 
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about the inherent value of women in Northern Irish society, and is an indication of deeper 
gender disparity present in the province.  
 The WRDA and WPG alike express concern over the risks to women’s rights associated 
with Brexit, as many rights enjoyed by women in Northern Ireland are a result of European 
Union policies, including measures such as equal pay, protections against discrimination on the 
basis of pregnancy (Powell, 2020; WPG, 2019).  One particular area for improvement in 
Northern Irish law is in the issue of parental leave (WPG, 2019). As of now, parental leave 
consists of eighteen weeks of unpaid leave for each eligible child (Labour Relations Agency, 
2019). This framework is consistent with the measures set forth by the UK, but insufficient to 
support women’s progress in the workplace and the broader society (Government Digital 
Service, 2015; WPG, 2019).  
Ireland 
 In their final report in 2014, the Constitutional Convention included a recommendation to 
amend Article 41.2 of the Irish Constitution. Article 41.2 reads,  
“ (1) In particular, the States recognises that by her life within the home, woman 
gives to the State a support without which the common good cannot be achieved. 
(2) The State shall, therefore, endeavor to ensure that mothers shall not be 
obliged by economic necessity to engage in labour to the neglect of their duties in 
the home.” (Ireland, 1945). 
 
After meeting for multiple years to discuss problems facing the Republic of Ireland, the 
Constitutional Convention recommended that “Article 41.2 should be made gender-neutral to 
include other careers both ‘in the home’ and ‘beyond the home’ (Convention on the Constitution, 
2014, Appendix D).9 Further, the convention recommended additional amendments to make 
                                               
9 The Constitutional Convention met to review pressing issues in the Republic of Ireland and suggest changes or 
areas for concern. Unlike in the American context, the members of the Convention were not empowered to draft a 
constitution, or even amend the document themselves.  
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constitutional language gender inclusive and provide explicit language on gender equality 
(Convention on the Constitution, 2014, Appendix D). The Irish government established task 
forces on these issues in 2014; however, little progress has been made since its adoption.  
 In 2018, the Irish Human Rights and Equity Commission issued a report recommending 
changes to Article 41.2. In the report, IHREC cites previous proposals on Article 41.2, including 
the Convention’s work and the subsequent task force (Irish Human Rights and Equality 
Commission, 2018). A referendum on removing Article 41.2 from the Constitution was supposed 
to take place on October 26, 2018; however, the Oireachtas Justice and Equality Committee 
opted to continue “pre-legislative scrutiny”, which pushed back the timeline (Department of 
Justice, 2018; McMorrow, 2018). Most recently, the matter has been referred to the Citizen’s 
Assembly. In 2020, a majority of the Assembly noted their support for the article’s deletion, 
though the article remains unchanged in 2021 (Irish Legal News, 2020). 
 
Theoretical Framework 
 Political issues related to gender, such as sexuality, abortion, contraception, divorce, 
family, and gender roles are all matters of social traditionalism to which various organized 
religious groups have weighed in on at various points in time. Organized religion has the 
capacity to influence perceptions on these issues at both the individual and societal level 
(Bloomer et al., 2019, p. 51). Particularly, I will focus on how Protestant and Catholic religious 
organizations have weighed in on the issues of reproductive freedom, same-sex relationships, 
and gender roles.  
 No one denomination has a monopoly on these issues. Catholic and Protestant groups 
have lobbied, both separately and together, regarding gendered political issues (Bloomer et al, 
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2019, p. 60). Abortion has been a continued topic of particular salience for both groups in recent 
history. Authors like Vicky Randall attribute the historical salience of abortion in the secular and 
religious realms to the rise of second wave feminism in the 1960’s and 70’s (Randall, 1992, p. 
112). Governments maintained regressive, strict abortion restrictions, often supported by 
religious institutions and interest groups. As religious groups mobilized in support of abortion 
bans, secular and feminist groups would push back in opposition (Randall, 1992). This push and 
pull between religious and secular groups on opposite sides of gendered issues has persisted to 
today’s political climate.  
       The literature around Irish religious and national identity is nuanced and suggests 
multiple distinct, and somewhat conflicting, views as to how religious identity operates on both 
sides of the Irish border. My analysis will shed light on which frameworks are apparent on each 
side of the Irish border and how they impact personal opinions on social policy. Here, I will 
expand on each theory as it is supported by the literature. This section closes with an overview of 
these theories and how they may be evidenced in my analysis.   
 
Countermobilization Theory  
 The countermobilization theory is most strongly supported by the 1993 piece by Jelen, 
O’Donnell, and Wilcox which studies abortion attitudes in Western Europe. Their piece suggests 
the presence of a countermobilization effect, especially as it relates to religious minority 
mobilization in Catholic-majority countries (Jelen, et al., 1993). This piece posits that, while the 
Catholic church is effective in socializing Catholics to a pro-life stance, this effectiveness 
motivates a countermobilization of pro-choice, non-Catholics (Jelen, et al., 1993, p. 380). In their 
study, the respondents most sympathetic to abortion rights were non-Catholics living in Catholic-
majority countries (p. 381). Further analysis suggests that this countermobilization may also 
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operationalize in the other direction, with Catholic respondents in Protestant-majority countries 
providing the most conservative, pro-life responses (p. 381). According to the 
countermobilization theory, it matters most whether an individual is a member of the majority or 
minority religious group in their country. If the countermobilization theory is present in this 
context, it would likely be most evident amongst the Protestant minority in the Republic of 
Ireland.  
 
Ethno-Religious Theory  
 The ethno-religious theory refers to the idea that religious group identification is the most 
determinative factor of social and political beliefs. A prime example of this ethno-religious 
model can be seen in the American context. In their book, Wald and Calhoun-Brown discuss the 
political cohesion present within the Black Church and the Jewish community. For these groups, 
their religious identity has political meaning. The authors note that these groups are both 
religiously and politically distinct, as Jewish individuals and members of the Black Church tend 
to support the Democratic Party (Wald & Calhoun-Brown, 2018).  
If the ethno-religious theory is universally applicable and religious identity is always the 
most salient indicator, national contexts shouldn’t matter. On the other hand, it is possible that 
this theory is not equally applicable to all societies. It may be that religious group identity 
matters greatly in divided societies, such as Northern Ireland, due to the history of social and 
political ramifications of religious group identity.  
There is some evidence to support the idea that ethno-religious patterns are particularly 
relevant in the Northern Irish context. In his 2007 piece, Tom Inglis notes that religious identity 
is particularly salient in Northern Ireland due to the history of religious conflict in the country 
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(Inglis, 2007). Further, Claire Mitchell discusses the social and psychological impact religious 
group identity can have, particularly in the Northern Irish context (Mitchell, 2005). Specifically, 
Protestant and Catholic divisions in Northern Ireland have exhibited notable impacts on 
employment, housing, and education to name a few areas (Mitchell, 2005). In addition, Mitchell 
says, “Protestant and Catholic identifications in Northern Ireland still matter to one’s life chances 
and place in society” (Mitchell, 2005, p. 5). The author goes on to discuss the importance of 
religious group identity in the Northern Irish political arena. My data analysis will use survey 
data from both sides of the Irish border to determine whether there is support for the ethno-




 According to the religiosity theory, how religiously devout an individual is matters more 
than what religious group they are a part of. There is both a private and social aspect of 
religiosity. It could be that a person’s private religious practices are most impactful, such as daily 
prayer. Alternatively, the frequency of a person’s church attendance might be more 
determinative of their social values. Additionally, individual beliefs about the Bible may help 
determine attitudes on gendered topics, as those who believe in biblical literalism may be more 
legalistic on social issues. Even still, each measure may play its own role in the ultimate 
formation of social attitudes. If the religiosity theory holds true, it means that there is more 
diversity within religious identity groups than between people of different religious traditions. 
For example, in the context of this study, the religiosity theory would indicate that there are more 
significant differences between the social beliefs of devout and nominal Catholics than between 
a devout Catholic and a devout Protestant.  
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 It is important to note that there is significant debate among scholars as to which 
measures of religiosity matter most, particularly as it relates to survey questions. In the 1960’s, 
Glock and Stark put forth a multidimensional framework of religiosity that still impacts the study 
of religion to this day (Clayton & Gladden, 1974). In that framework, Glock and Stark posit that 
there are five main dimensions to religiosity, including belief, knowledge, religious rituals, 
personal religious experiences, and secular consequences of belief (Clayton & Gladden, 1974). 
Since then, researchers have tried to operationalize this framework through the creation of survey 
questions honing in on these various dimensions of religiosity; however, no one group of 
indicators are universally accepted. According to McAndrew and Voas, “it has become 
conventional to focus on three aspects of religious involvement: belief, practice, and affiliation” 
(McAndrew & Voas, 2011, p. 3). Still, well-respected institutions like the Pew Research Center 
use measures including “affiliation, importance of religion, worship attendance, and frequency of 
prayer” (Pew, 2018).   
 McAndrew and Voas note an important limitation of survey responses related to 
religiosity – Americans tend to overreport religious attendance in surveys when they are asked 
how often they attend (Hawaway & Marler, 1992; McAndrew & Voas, 2011, p. 5); however, this 
trend runs the opposite way in countries like France (Brenner, 2011, p. 35). Existing literature 
does not uncover which way this trend runs in the Irish context. McAndrew and Voas also note 
sensitivity to question wording as a challenge for those interested in studying religiosity, as the 
way a question is worded may significantly change the answer a respondent provides. They note 
that the International Social Survey Program is attractive to this point because they maintain a 
great deal of consistency in question wording related to religiosity over time (McAndrew & 
Voas, 2011, p. 11). Multivariate analysis will uncover which measures of religiosity significantly 
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impact views on abortion, same-sex marriage, and gender roles on both sides of the border when 
all other variables are controlled for. 
 
Theories of religion and political socialization 
Countermobilization Theory 
Definition: Political success of a religious minority motivates countermobilization of religious 
minorities with differing opinions (Jelen, et al., 1993).  
Example: The success of pro-life Catholics spurs the mobilization of pro-choice Protestants. 
If this theory is present in the Irish context, I expect to find the strongest evidence in the 
Republic of Ireland between the Catholic majority and Protestant minority.  
Ethno-religious Theory 
Definition: Religious group identification is the most determinative factor of social and 
political beliefs (Inglis, 2007; Mitchell, 2005).  
Example: In the American context, Jewish voters tend to support the Democratic Party. 
If this theory is present in the Irish context, I expect to find strong sectarian differences 
between Protestants and Catholics on the issues studied.  
Religiosity Theory 
Definition: How religiously devout an individual is matters more than what religious group 
they are a part of (Clayton & Gladden, 1974; McAndrew & Voas, 2011).  
Example: There are significant differences in the opinion of a Sunday School teacher and 
someone who only attends church on religious holidays.  
If this theory is present in the Irish context, I expect to find strong, statistically significant 
results for each measure of personal religiosity on each dependent variable.  
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Data, Variables, and Methods 
 The quantitative portion of this study is based on International Social Survey Programme 
(ISSP) data from 1991 and 2008.10 The ISSP conducts a survey yearly which is distributed cross-
nationally. The ISSP repeats some surveys over time to follow trends in social values, including 
topics like the environment, gender roles and family, and religion. The Religion ISSP survey was 
conducted in 1991, 1998, 2008, and 2018; however, Northern Ireland was not included in the 
2018 wave of the survey. In this quantitative analysis, I use data from the 1991 and 2008 survey 
waves, as they represent the oldest and newest religion data available from ISSP on both sides of 
the Irish border.  
 The two main categories of independent variables in this analysis are religious group 
identity and personal religiosity. In each wave of the survey, respondents were asked to identify 
their religious identity group. To best represent the Irish context, I created dummy variables for 
Catholics, Protestants, and those with “No Religion”. Though the denominational categories 
available in each wave of the survey are somewhat unique, the Protestant category encompasses 
denominations such as Baptist, Methodist, Presbyterian, and those who identify themselves as 
“other Christian”.  The “No Religion” category, also referred to as the religiously unaffiliated, 
only include individuals who indicated their religious group as “None”. The inclusion of “none” 
as a religious group category is consistent with the operationalization of religious unaffiliation in 
recent social science research on religion and politics (Wald & Calhoun Brown, 2018, p. 26).  
 I have chosen three independent variables related to personal religiosity, including 
frequency of church attendance, self-reported religiosity, and beliefs about authorship of the 
                                               
10 The ISSP data and survey mechanisms used in this study can be found at http://w.issp.org/data-download/by-
topic/ under the Religion section.  
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Bible. These particular variables were chosen to encompass the competing views regarding 
measures of personal religiosity discussed above. Some believe socially based indicators of 
religiosity matter more, such as church attendance. Meanwhile, others believe what individuals 
do on their own time is more indicative of their true religiosity, such as their personal beliefs 
about the Bible and how often they pray.  
In this analysis, I use church attendance to encompass the social aspect of personal 
religiosity. On the other hand, self-reported religiosity and feelings about the Bible highlight the 
second, more individualistic, mode of religiosity. Self-reported religiosity is measured on a 
seven-point scale from extremely religious to extremely non-religious (see Appendix 1 for full 
wording of questions used). Additionally, related to their feelings about the Bible, respondents 
are asked whether they believe the Bible is the actual word of God, the inspired word of God, or 
an ancient book of fables.11 These responses indicate the level of biblical literalism exhibited by 
the respondent.  
 The distinction between individual and social aspects of religiosity became apparent early 
in this study. Initially, I intended to create a religiosity index of two questions including how 
often a respondent prays and how often they attend church. Interestingly, in each wave of the 
survey data, the alpha for these questions was not high enough to support the creation of an 
index. In my view, this inability to create a religiosity index implies that the scholarly debate 
regarding indicators of personal religiosity is particularly relevant to this case study. I hope that 
my analysis will shed light on which metrics of personal religiosity are most impactful in the 
Irish context.  
                                               
11 The question regarding Biblical literalism was not asked in Northern Ireland in 2008.  
 30 
 Additionally, this project revolves around three dependent variables, including attitudes 
on abortion, same-sex relationships, and gender roles in the family. To study attitudes regarding 
abortion access, two questions are indexed. The first abortion question revolves around access to 
abortion in the interest of maternal health; meanwhile, a second question focuses on abortion 
access due to financial necessity.12 In 2018, the alpha for the abortion index in Northern Ireland 
was 0.739 and 0.809 in Ireland. In 1991, the alpha in Northern Ireland was 0.697 and 0.793 in 
Ireland. In each year, the abortion questions are asked on a six-point scale. Responses include: 
almost always wrong, always wrong, wrong only sometimes, not wrong at all, can’t choose, and 
no answer. For the purposes of this analysis, responses of “can’t choose” and “no answer” are 
coded as missing data. Thus, the abortion index is measured on a scale of 2-8, with lower values 
indicating more conservative responses and vice versa.  
  To study attitudes on same-sex relationships, I use identical questions from the 1991 and 
2008 waves of the survey, which ask respondents to report on a four-point scale the degree to 
which they believe sexual relations between two people of the same sex are wrong or not wrong 
(see Appendix 1 for question wording). Additionally, to measure attitudes about gender roles, I 
pull data from a question asked in both 1991 and 2008 regarding a respondent’s level of 
agreement with the statement that a husband’s job is to earn money while a wife’s job is to take 
care of the home and family (see Appendix 1). Responses were given on a five-point scale from 
strongly agree to strongly disagree. For both the same-sex and gender roles question, an option 
was provided for those who “can’t choose”. For each question, I have coded these responses as 
missing data. In addition, all variables are coded so that responses with lower numerical values 
                                               
12 Note that question wording on abortion differs between 1991 and 2008 (See Appendix 1 for full question 
wording). In 1991, respondents are asked their thoughts on whether the law should permit abortion in various 
circumstances; meanwhile, in 2008, the questions hinge on one’s personal beliefs regarding abortion. Neither wave 
of the ISSP survey asks respondents about their general feelings on abortion without these particular circumstances. 
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indicate conservative values while higher values indicate liberal attitudes. To test the relationship 
between religion and various social values, I performed both bivariate and multivariate ordered 
probit analysis.  
Statistical Results 
Overview 
The crux of my findings indicate that religion and personal religiosity operate differently 
on both sides of the Irish border. In other words, my analysis of the Irish case study does not 
provide universal support for any one theory set forth in the literature. In Northern Ireland, 
sectarian differences between Protestants and Catholics on issues of abortion, same sex 
relationships, and gender roles are apparent in the data. This finding indicates that religious 
identity operates in a way most congruent with the ethnoreligious model in the North. In other 
words, religious group identity matters a great deal alongside personal religiosity in Northern 
Ireland. There is also support for the religiosity model in the North. Meanwhile, in the Republic 
of Ireland, sectarian differences are not as apparent regarding the issues studied. Instead, 
personal religiosity is the primary driver of attitudinal differences on social issues regarding 
gender and sexuality. As such, there is strong evidence of the religiosity model in the Republic. 
No statistical findings offer support for the countermobilization theory in the Irish context.  
 
Northern Ireland 
 The trend evidenced in Northern Ireland between 1991 and 2008 indicate strong support 
for the proposed ethnoreligious and religiosity models. In other words, my data analysis shows 
that both religiosity and religious identity matter a great deal in Northern Ireland. In 1991 and 
2008 alike, sectarian differences are clear between Protestants and Catholics in their attitudes on 
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social issues, with a higher proportion of Catholics exhibiting conservative views on abortion 
than Protestants (see Table 1).  
It is important to contextualize these results in light of the questions asked about abortion 
access. Notably, in each year, both abortion questions indexed ask the respondent about their 
level of agreement with abortion access in the event of medical necessity and financial necessity 
respectively (See Appendix 1). This means that more liberal scores on the abortion index 
indicate more agreement with these exceptions which would allow for abortion access. More 
liberal scores on the abortion index do not necessarily mean that respondents agree with more 
generalized abortion access without medical or financial necessity.  
The sectarian divide changes in regards to Northern Irish religious attitudes about same-
sex relationships. In both 1991 and 2008, bivariate ordered probit models show that Protestants 
were significantly more conservative than non-Protestants in their beliefs on same-sex 
relationships and gender roles in family. Bivariate models also indicate that Catholics were more 
liberal than non-Catholics in 2008 regarding same-sex relationships, while no statistically 
significant relationship can be found in 1991. Alternately, Catholics exhibited more liberal 
beliefs than non-Catholics on gender roles in 1991, while no statistically significant relationship 
emerges in the 2008 data. The bivariate models indicate that neither Catholics nor Protestants are 






Table 1: Northern Ireland, Abortion Index 2008 13 
 
Catholic Protestant No religion 
2 (most conservative) 39.35 20.69 13.89 
3 7.97 10.46 8.33 
4 18.05 16.88 8.8 
5 10.08 13.44 14.81 
6 12.36 18.67 18.52 
7 3.58 5.47 5.56 
8 (most liberal) 8.62 14.39 30.09 
Total 100 100 100 
Sig *** *** *** 
The values of each column sum to 100 after rounding. “Sig.” reports statistical significance of 
bivariate ordered probit models testing the relationship between the Column variable and the 









                                               
13 The trend demonstrated in this table is also evidenced in the 1991 Northern Ireland data.  
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An Emerging Ethno-religious Group: The Nones in Northern Ireland 
While bivariate ordered probit models are useful in showing the general trends in belief 
between those in the religious in-group and out-group, multivariate ordered probit models allow 
for a more rigorous analysis. When all variables are accounted for in the model, different and 
more nuanced trends emerge (see Table 2). Most notably, the multivariate model indicates that 
the religiously unaffiliated population emerged as its own politically cohesive group between 
1991 and 2008. Further, by 2008, the “nones” follow the same ethnoreligious pattern 
demonstrated by Catholics and Protestants across all waves of Northern Ireland data.  
This multivariate model is coded to compare all listed variables to the un-listed religious 
identity group – Catholics. Strikingly, the “No Religion” group is not statistically significant on 
any dependent variable in 1991, but was significant across all dependent variables in 2008.14 
This means that the religiously unaffiliated in Northern Ireland were not yet acting as a 
politically cohesive group in 1991, which changed by 2008. It follow that, by 2008, the “nones” 
began to map onto the sectarian, ethno-religious pattern observable between Protestants and 
Catholics in the North since the earliest waves of data collection, which supports the presence of 
an ethnoreligious model as it relates to the Northern Irish case.  
It is worth noting that the gendered social issues studied do not line up neatly along the 
Protestant-Catholic split. While Catholics are conservative on abortion, they are liberal on same-
sex marriage and gender roles. At the same time, Protestants are liberal on abortion while 
holding more conservative views on same-sex marriage and gender roles; however, the 
unaffiliated are consistently liberal on all topics studied (see Table 2). These findings suggest 
                                               
14 This is not to say that the unaffiliated population weren’t a generally liberal group in 1991. Bivariate cross 
tabulations indicate religiously unaffiliated individuals were more liberal than religiously affiliated individuals 
(including Protestants and Catholics) in 1991. 
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that Protestants and Catholics in the North do not view the issues of abortion, same-sex marriage, 
and gender roles as interconnected when forming their political opinions. I will further expand 
on this dynamic in the qualitative portion of my thesis.  
 The Northern Ireland multivariate analysis also reveals a consistent pattern over time 
regarding measures of personal religiosity and their impact on social values. Interestingly, 
attendance, self-identified religiosity, and feelings about the Bible all exhibit a statistically 
significant relationship with the dependent variables in Northern Ireland, with one exception. It 
seems that attendance at religious services is not a good indicator of gender role attitudes, which 
is evidenced by the lack of significance in Table 2 across all years. In sum, it appears there is 





Table 2: Northern Ireland Multivariate Analysis15 
 1991 2008 
 Abortion Index Same-Sex Gender Roles Abortion Index Same-Sex Gender Roles 
Protestant 0.586*** -0.446*** -0.245** 0.375*** -0.771*** -0.121 
 [0.116] [0.132] [0.100] [0.087] [0.103] [0.082] 
No Religion 0.208 -.412 -0.253 0.797*** 0.508** 0.274* 
 [0.206] [0.254] [0.189] [0.184] [0.225] [0.159] 
Attendance -0.076*** -0.061** -0.003 -0.076*** -0.114*** -0.008 
 [0.022] [0.028] [0.021] [0.021] [0.024] [0.019] 
Self-identified religiosity -0.163*** -0.169** -0.133** -0.214*** -0.218*** -0.113*** 
 [0.056] [0.074] [0.060] [0.040] [0.047] [0.034] 









      
N 652 701 751 876 860 1,030 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Ordered Probit Models with Standard Errors in Brackets.    
                                               
15 Every dependent variable is coded so that higher values indicate more liberal views and lower values indicate more conservative views.  
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The Republic of Ireland 
 Analysis of the data in the Republic of Ireland most strongly supports the religiosity 
theory, wherein religiosity is the most impactful religious indicator for individual beliefs. While 
bivariate models show some impact for religious denomination variables, in the more rigorous 
multivariate analysis, it is the religiosity variables that are more robustly tied to views on gender 
and sexuality. 
In Ireland, bivariate analysis shows that Catholics are consistently more conservative than 
non-Catholics on the issue of abortion in 1991 and 2008. Analysis of the 1991 wave of data 
indicates that Catholics were also more conservative on issues of same sex couples and 
traditional gender roles at that time. Interestingly, in 1991 bivariate analysis, Protestants were 
found to be more liberal on issues of abortion than non-Protestants, yet there is no statistically 
significant relationship present in 2008. Further, in 2008, Protestants were found to be more 
conservative on same sex relationships when compared to those in the outgroup. Consistent to 
the literature, the bivariate analysis indicates that the religiously unaffiliated were consistently 







Table 3: Ireland Abortion Index, 2008 16  
 
Catholic Protestant No religion 
2 (most conservative) 33.44 23.06 14.63 
3 8.69 16.13 5.75 
4 18.64 19.42 14.58 
5 14.62 12.39 11.88 
6 12.57 8.14 22.33 
7 3.92 10.09 7.56 
8 (most liberal) 8.1 10.78 23.27 




The values of each column sum to 100 after rounding. “Sig.” reports statistical significance of 
bivariate ordered probit models testing the relationship between the Column variable and the 
Abortion index. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
However, when controlling for all variables at once, it becomes clear that religious 
identity operates differently on this side of the border. Unlike in Northern Ireland, the sectarian 
differences between Protestants and Catholics in the Republic are not the significant driving 
force of differences on abortion, LGBT relationships, and gender role attitudes. Instead, 
multivariate analysis shows that measures of personal religiosity are consistently significant as it 
relates to each dependent variable across all waves of data (See Table 4). 
                                               
16 Similar trends are found in 1991 for Catholics and the Nones; however, there is a statistically significant 
relationship in 1991 in the positive direction, indicating Protestants were more liberal than non-Protestants on 




Table 4: Ireland Multivariate Analysis17 
 1991 2008 
 Abortion Index Same-Sex Gender Roles Abortion Index Same-Sex Gender Roles 
Protestant 0.275 -0.319 -0.239 0.075 -0.486*** 0.075 
 [0.199] [0.265] [0.212] [0.160] [0.242] [0.136] 
No Religion 0.09 0 0.313 -0.201 -0.244 -0.193 
 [0.331] [0.303] [0.309] [0.173] [0.242] [0.174] 
Attendance -0.119*** -0.123*** -0.038** -0.1*** -0.158*** -0.064*** 
 [0.019] [0.023] [0.019] [0.026] [0.027] [0.021] 
Self-identified religiosity -0.088* -0.154** -0.143*** -0.2*** -0.171*** -0.085 
 [0.046] [0.061] [0.046] [0.041] [0.051] [0.046] 
Feelings about Bible -0.278*** -0.378*** -0.392*** -0.306*** -0.262*** -0.127** 
 [0.061] [0.068] [0.058] [0.062] [0.067] [0.059] 
 
      
N 862 840 919 1,235 1,274 1,510 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Ordered Probit Models with Standard Errors in Brackets.    
 
      
 
                                               
17 Every dependent variable is coded so that higher values indicate more liberal views and lower values indicate more conservative views. 
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In the Republic, multivariate analysis indicates that personal religiosity matters more than 
religious group identity in shaping attitudes about abortion, LBGTQ+ issues, and gender roles. In 
other words, it doesn’t matter whether an individual identifies as Catholic, Protestant, or 
religiously unaffiliated. What really matters is their personal level of religiosity. Interestingly, 
though I have earlier expanded on the debate between scholars regarding measures of personal 
religiosity, this multivariate model indicates that church attendance, self-rated religiosity, and 
level of Biblical literalism are all consistently impactful in the context of the Republic.   
Similarly to the North, bivariate analysis indicates that the unaffiliated hold significantly 
more liberal opinions on social issues than the religiously affiliated. Interestingly, when models 
take account of religiosity measures, the unaffiliated in the Republic do not follow the same 
trend earlier evidenced in the North. The “nones” do not emerge in 2008 as a politically distinct 
group, which is demonstrated by the consistent lack of statistical significance in the multivariate 
model. This stark difference in trends across the Irish border supports my position that the impact 
of religion on social values is unique to each national context.  
 
Liberal Catholics in the Republic of Ireland 
The lack of statistical significance in the multivariate model across time for the 
unaffiliated does not contradict earlier findings that the unaffiliated are a generally liberal group. 
Instead, this lack of significance likely says more about the Catholic population in the Republic. 
The multivariate model compares groups listed to groups unlisted, meaning that the “No 
Religion” line compares the religiously unaffiliated to the Catholic population in the Republic. 
The consistent lack of significance may indicate that there are many nominally religious 
Catholics in the Republic of Ireland; however, not all liberal Catholics are nominal in their 
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personal religiosity. This non-effect could also indicate the presence of devout Catholics who 
merely disagree with the Catholic Church’s stance on various social issues. I will further expand 
on this phenomenon in the qualitative section of this project.  
As for nominal Catholics, while these individuals still consider themselves to be Catholic, 
their levels of personal religiosity are more similar to those reported by the religiously 
unaffiliated in the Republic. Like the religiously unaffiliated, these nominal Catholics also tend 
to hold liberal beliefs on abortion, LGBTQ+ relationships, and gender roles. I will expand on this 
group of liberal Catholics in the qualitative section of this paper. These findings are not 
inconsistent with existing literature which has documented the decline of the Catholic “Moral 
Monopoly” as well as significant differences between nominal and devout Catholics in Ireland 
(Buckley, 2016, p. 67, 79). Overall, though many individuals still label themselves as Catholic, 
they are not distinguishable as a traditionally “conservative Catholic” when their social and 
political beliefs are held up against others in Ireland. 
 
Qualitative Evidence 
 When it comes to the impact of elite rhetoric on social values, Pierson and Bloomer say it 
best when noting “who says what about abortion contributes to the outcomes that we will see in 
law and policy” (Bloomer & Pierson, 2017, p. 174). Given the strong relationship in the 
quantitative data between religion and all social values studied, I posit that “who says what” 
about abortion, LGBTQ+ issues, and gender roles all matters a great deal. In this portion of my 
study, I will expand on my statistical findings by analyzing various public statements published 
by religious and activist groups on both sides of the Irish border. If the findings of my statistical 
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models have persisted to modern day, I anticipate qualitative sources will provide evidence of 
three main trends.  
First, in the North, I expect to find the presence of major religiously unaffiliated groups 
mobilizing around the latest social controversies regarding abortion and LGBTQ+ rights.18 
Further, consistent with statistical findings, sectarian differences in elite rhetoric and framing of 
social issues should be apparent in the North. Lastly, if the trends in the Republic have persisted, 
I anticipate the presence of liberal Catholic groups mobilizing around today’s gendered social 
issues; however, I do not expect to find evidence of these individuals mobilizing within the 
Church due to their nominal religiosity and opposition to traditional Catholic teachings. 
In this portion of my study, I will present multiple case studies which suggest that each 
quantitative trend uncovered has persisted to modern day debates on gendered social issues;   
however, it is important to note that this analysis is in no way exhaustive or fully representative 
of religion and social values in Ireland today. Future research should expand on this framework 
to collect a representative sample of public statements from churches and religiously unaffiliated 
activist groups to perform a more structured content analysis.  
 
Northern Ireland: Sectarian Divides 
While statistical evidence shows that Northern Irish Protestants hold more liberal beliefs 
than Catholics on the issue of abortion, Protestants exhibited more conservative views on same-
sex relationships than Catholics in 2008. This quantitative evidence demonstrates that gendered 
social issues do not line up neatly down the Protestant and Catholic divide. That is, neither 
                                               
18 Here, I omit analysis of elite rhetoric on gender roles due to lack of modern day qualitative material on gender 
roles in law in Ireland. There have not yet been widespread modern day debates on gender roles in law on either side 
of the Irish border; however, future research should closely follow these issues for changes, such as the potential 
referendum on Article 41.2 of the Irish Constitution (Convention on the Constitution, 2014, Appendix D).  
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Protestants nor Catholics are consistently liberal or conservative on all gendered social issues. 
This quantitative trend suggests potential for differences in religious elite rhetoric, particularly 
on the issues of abortion and LGBTQ+ issues. In this section, I will compare the sectarian trends 
uncovered in the ISSP analysis to modern-day elite rhetoric from Protestant and Catholic leaders.  
 
Sectarian Divides in Religious Elite Rhetoric on Abortion 
In April 2020, the Catholic Bishops of Northern Ireland submitted a letter to the Northern 
Ireland Legislative Assembly regarding abortion regulations that were being debated at the time. 
The letter makes it clear that the Catholic leadership in Northern Ireland still stands firmly 
against abortion rights. The letter states,  
“ Our opposition to the new abortion Regulations brought into effect here by the 
Westminster Parliament is rooted in the Catholic Church’s teaching concerning 
the dignity of every human life, regardless of age, ability, gender, or background. 
This teaching prohibits the direct and deliberate intention to end the life of an 
unborn baby at any state of his or her development. This right to life of the child 
is inextricably linked to the right to life and well-being of the mother” (Martin, et 
al., 2020).  
 
This 2020 statement suggest that the elite rhetoric on abortion by Catholic leaders in the North 
still maps onto sectarian trends evidenced in the 1991-2008 ISSP data. 
 One major point of difference between Protestant and Catholic elite rhetoric on the issue 
of abortion is the right to access abortions out of medical necessity. A 2016 article quotes Tim 
Bartlett on this issue. At the time, Bartlett served as the secretary of the Catholic Council for 
Social Affairs (Sherwood, 2016). Bartlett emphasized that the Catholic Church works with 
“’women whose babies have life-limiting conditions’” (Sherwood, 2016). Bartlett goes on to say 
that “’the child is still technically, clinically and in every sense alive as a human person, and is 
entitled to have their life protected’” (Sherwood, 2016). On the other hand, Normal Hamilton, an 
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affiliate of the Presbyterian Church expressed different sentiments. Though Hamilton 
emphasized the Presbyterian Church’s objection to abortion as a form of birth control, he 
describes the Church as being “content” with regulations which allow for abortion access when it 
is medically necessary (Sherwood, 2016).  
Hamilton’s statements are consistent with other statements from major Protestant 
churches in the North. In 2019, the Church of Ireland submitted a “Response to Abortion 
Services Framework Consultation”. In this response, the Church of Ireland details their belief 
about each provision of the proposed abortion legislation (Church of Ireland, 2019). Throughout 
this document, the Church reiterates their objection to “abortion on demand” (Church of Ireland, 
2019, p. 1); however, the Church of Ireland directly states their belief that abortion should be 
“available in cases of medical necessity” (Church of Ireland, 2019, p. 1). That is, abortion should 
be available when there is “a risk to the life, or of serious harm to the health, of the pregnant 
woman” (Church of Ireland, 2019, p. 2).  
As I noted in the quantitative results section, the ISSP survey questions on abortion only 
ask about a respondent’s level of agreement with abortion access in the event of medical and 
financial necessity. This means that Protestants in the North were found to be more liberal than 
Catholics in their views regarding access to abortion under these circumstances. As such, the 
statements from Catholic and Protestant leaders in the North about when abortion should be 
available are consistent with trends uncovered in my quantitative analysis. 
 
Sectarian Divides in Religious Elite Rhetoric on Same-Sex Marriage 
 Meanwhile, analysis of the ISSP data uncovered that Northern Irish Protestants held more 
conservative beliefs regarding same-sex marriage than Catholics. As noted in the policy 
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overview, the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) has stood firmly against the legalization of 
same-sex marriage. Further, the DUP has longstanding ties to the Free Presbyterian Church, as 
each organization was founded by Ian Paisley Sr (Savage, 2019). As such, I look to the Free 
Presbyterian Church for evidence of their religious elite rhetoric around same-sex marriage 
today.19  
 In January 2020, the General Presbytery of the Free Presbyterian Church of Ulster 
published two press releases in response to the legalization of same-sex marriage in the North, 
which began on January 13, 2020. In the first press release, the Church re-emphasized their 
belief that “marriage is a holy institution given by God for the monogamous, lifelong, marital 
union of men and women” (Dane & Greer, 2020). This first statement also issues a grave 
warning to “legislators of evil” who will be called to account on Judgement Day (Dane & Greer, 
2020).  
 The second press release, also issued in January 2020, is a statement that directly urges 
politicians to prevent same-sex marriage in the Republic. In this statement, Reverends Dane and 
Greer emphasize their view of Scriptural teachings on marriage. Specifically, the Reverends 
argue “God’s abhorrence of same-sex sins above other sins”, as they believe the people of 
Sodom were destroyed due to their engagement in same-sex relationships (Dane & Greer, 2020). 
The Reverends warn that similar destruction will be forthcoming if society does not repent of 
same-sex sins (Dane & Greer, 2020).  
 Meanwhile, the Irish Catholic Bishops’ Conference also published a “Response to the 
Northern Ireland Office Consultation on same-sex religious marriage” (Martin, et al., 2020). 
                                               
19 The Free Presbyterian Church is a minority population within the larger Northern Irish Protestant community that 
evidences an extreme sectarian view of same-sex marriage. I do not posit that this view is reflective of the entire 
Protestant community. I present these statements as limited evidence of modern-day conservative views on 
LGBTQ+ issues among Protestants in the North.  
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Throughout this statement, the Bishops emphasize the rights and freedoms of religious 
organizations and advocate for regulations which protect the rights of churches to refuse to 
perform “religious same-sex marriages” if they are not comfortable doing so (Martin, et al., 
2020). While the Irish Catholic Bishop’s Conference advocates for these religious protections, 
the rhetoric used is quite different from that of the Free Presbyterian Church. To quote from the 
response,  
“ As Pope Francis explained in his Apostolic Exhortation on ‘The Joy of Love’ 
(Amoris Laetitia), ‘The Church makes her own the attitude of the Lord Jesus, who 
offers his boundless love to each person without exception… We would like before 
all else to reaffirm that every person, regardless of sexual orientation, ought to be 
respected in his or her dignity and treated with consideration, while every sign of 
unjust discrimination is to be carefully avoided, particularly any form of 
aggression and violence’” (Martin, et al., 2020). 
 
 
 Though the Free Presbyterian Church and Irish Catholic Bishops’ Conference 
seemingly agree that churches in Northern Ireland should not be forced to perform same-
sex religious marriage, there is a stark contrast in the rhetoric chosen by each group. 
While the Free Presbyterian Church uses rhetoric that emphasizes sin, repentance, and 
Judgement Day, the Irish Catholic Bishops’ Conference opts for affirmation and 
compassion for all people regardless of their sexuality. Further, the Free Presbyterian 
Church calls on legislators to reverse the legalization of same-sex marriage while the 
Irish Catholic Bishops’ Conference only advocates for regulations which would ensure 
religious institutions have a choice in performing same-sex religious marriage 
ceremonies. This conflicting, sectarian rhetoric from religious elites in the North offers 
limited qualitative support for my quantitative finding that Northern Irish Catholics 
exhibit more liberal views on same-sex marriage than Protestants. To more definitively 
assess whether the sectarian divides from 1991 and 2008 have persisted to modern day, 
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future research should aggregate a more representative sample of statements from 
religious elites in the North and conduct a more rigorous content analysis.  
 
Northern Ireland: The Nones 
 Consistent with earlier statistical analysis, the religiously unaffiliated are still a cohesive, 
influential group in Northern Ireland today. From 2013 to 2018, many atheists organized under 
Atheist Northern Ireland; however, this group dissolved in 2018 (Atheist Northern Ireland). In 
their final Facebook post, Atheist Northern Ireland encouraged their members to follow Northern 
Ireland Humanists, as many of the group’s administrators would be taking leadership posts there. 
From that time on, Northern Ireland Humanists became one the biggest and cohesive networks 
for the religiously unaffiliated. Northern Ireland Humanists was officially founded in 2016, 
though the group’s website notes that they have been active for decades prior (Northern Ireland 
Humanists, 2021). Further, Northern Ireland Humanists is a section of Humanists UK, which 
only adds to their legitimacy and cohesion.  
Northern Ireland Humanists have been a part of multiple successful campaigns related to 
the social values pertinent to this study. As midnight passed on October 21, 2019, the deadline to 
form a Northern Irish Executive officially closed. A blog post was shared to the Northern Ireland 
Humanist website late that night celebrating the simultaneous passage of provisions legalizing 
same-sex marriage and decriminalized abortions (Northern Ireland Humanists, 2019). The author 
of the blog post notes that Northern Ireland Humanists and Humanists UK had campaigned on 
these issues for decades. The existence and growth of the unaffiliated population demonstrated 
by the success and status of Northern Ireland Humanists is consistent with the trends evidenced 
in the 2008 ISSP data. 
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Even as the group celebrated their success in 2019, they emphasize that their work is far 
from over. The October 21 blog post says,  
“However, work has not finished: over the coming months we need to closely 
watch the legislation to ensure that these rights promised to women and LGBT 
people are delivered in full.” (Northern Ireland Humanists, 2019).  
Today, abortion is still listed as a campaign platform for  Northern Ireland Humanists, as they  
are still active in ensuring abortions are “safe, free, and available to all (Northern Ireland 
Humanists, 2021). The Northern Ireland Humanists have partnered extensively with the British 
Humanist Association as well as Humanists UK to campaign for abortion rights in the North. 
This advocacy has primarily taken place through litigation. Recent successes this coalition 
include multiple legal wins which ensure women in Northern Ireland have access to safe and free 
abortions through the National Health Service (Humanists UK, 2016). Future research should 
continue to follow the growth and mobilization of the religiously unaffiliated in Northern Ireland 
as they work to further liberal social causes.   
 
A Brief Note on Nones in the Republic  
 Subsequent research should also track the growth of the religiously unaffiliated 
population in the Republic of Ireland. The biggest unaffiliated network in the Republic is Atheist 
Ireland and was founded in 2008 (Atheist Ireland, 2021). Similarly to the Northern Ireland 
Humanists, Atheist Ireland has been active and successful in their efforts to liberalize access to 
abortions and same sex marriage. This group has been particularly critical of Catholic rhetoric on 
abortion and LGBT issues since 2008. In 2017, Atheist Ireland addressed the Citizens Assembly 
as they debated issues such as abortion rights at the constitutional convention (Atheist Ireland, 
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2021). Today, Atheist Ireland is working to roll back Constitutional provisions that discriminate 
against non-religious individuals, reform Census questions regarding religion to better represent 
the religiously unaffiliated, and repeal Ireland’s blasphemy law (Atheist Ireland, 2021). 
 
Liberal Catholics in the Republic 
 After a thorough search, I was unable to find a single prominent organization specifically 
founded for liberal Catholics in the Republic; however, upon second glance, this is not a 
surprising result. Statistical analysis indicated that group identity was not salient in the Republic 
from 1991-2008. So, the lack of modern-day cohesive political or religious group for nominal 
Catholics is further indication that group identity is still not salient in the Republic today. 
Instead, interviews with Irish Archbishops and other church leaders directly address the impact 
of nominal Catholics – a population that is implied by earlier statistical analysis in the Republic. 
 In a 2018 interview the current archbishop of Armagh, Archbishop Eamon Martin, 
discussed the categories of Catholics from his point of view (Sherwood, 2018). First, he 
describes the modern-day devout Catholics as “a remnant” of what once was in the Republic. He 
then acknowledges the magnitude of people who consider themselves to be “nominally or 
culturally Catholic but who have drifted away from regular practice” (Sherwood, 2018). Lastly, 
there are individuals who have entirely rejected the Church’s teachings and are openly hostile to 
the religion (Sherwood, 2018). In another interview with the New York Times, Martin expands 
on why he believes the Catholic church is losing influence in Ireland.20 He says,  
                                               
20 Interestingly, in 2015, Martin refrained from telling Catholics how they should vote regarding the same-sex 
marriage referendum. Though it was public knowledge that he intended to vote No, he was not affiliated with any 
campaigns regarding the vote (McGarry, 2015). In my view, it seems that Martin is sensitive to negative opinions 
about the Church and has tried to refrain from furthering such sentiments through his actions.  
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“The scandals emerged at a moment which was either just the wrong time or the 
right time, depending on which side you are, for them to emerge. The two things, 
the change in the attitude to the church and the abuse, came together and had a 
disastrous effect” (Stack, 2017). 
Martin’s firsthand account regarding the causes of the Catholic Church’s downfall in the 
Republic are consistent with scholarly literature on the topic (Buckley, 2016; Inglis 
2017). A 2010 research report from the Irish Catholic Bishops Conference provides 
additional support for the existence of nominal Catholics in the Republic. The report 
notes that Catholics in the Republic pray less often, on average, than those in the North. 
Additionally, fewer Catholics in the Republic report attending Mass once a week or more 
compared to Catholics in Northern Ireland (O’Mahony, 2010).  
Martin later expands on his beliefs regarding the number of true Catholics in 
Ireland. While over three-fourths of the population in the Republic identified themselves 
as Catholic in the 2011 census, “the archbishop said he believed the figure for true 
believers was closer to 20 percent” (Stack, 2017). These statements from the Irish 
Archbishop make complete sense when compared to the statistical findings of this piece. 
Martin’s analysis of nominal Catholicism support the conclusion that no significant 
difference could be found between the nones and Catholics in my multivariate analysis 
because many people who are actually rather distant from the Church in practice and 
belief still call themselves Catholic and respond in kind on surveys. Further, there are 
those who are entirely hostile to the Church, who now likely identify as a religious 
“none”, both in day-to-day life as well as when they are asked to identify on surveys.  
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My search for case studies doesn’t specifically reveal liberal Catholic groups 
mobilizing around abortion access in the Republic; however, prominent pro-choice 
Catholic figures demonstrate that not all liberal Catholics are nominal in their personal 
religiosity. For instance, the most prominent example of a practicing liberal Catholic is 
former president of the Republic, Mary Robinson. Mary Robinson is an outspoken pro-
choice Catholic who has consistently advocated for abortion rights. Robinson’s 
biography, authored by Olivia O’Leary and Helen Burke, revealed that Robinson was in 
favor of abortion access in the Republic (Molloy, 1998). This move shocked many 
Catholics in the Republic and beyond and spurred great pushback within the Catholic 
community (Molloy, 1998). 
 In the biography, Robinson says, “I was very angry at a lot of what the Church 
stood for at that time [the 1960’s], at how religion could become power-play and 
oppressive, undermining the true sense of spirituality and the true ethical norms and 
standards that are at the highest reaches of the human mind” (Molloy, 1998). Similarly, in 
a 2009 interview, Robinson criticizes the Catholic Church for the religious framework 
and traditions which “subjugate women” to “second class citizens” (The Elders, 2009). 
Despite her sustained, public criticism of the Church, Robinson has been quite open 
about her personal religiosity and Catholic identity. She says, “I’m deeply spiritual and 
I’m seeking to understand the way in which so much of the Catholic Church is so 
authoritarian not supporting family planning” (Irish Central, 2013). Robinson goes on to 
share her belief that, “the gospel of Jesus as being the highest standard that we can attain” 
(Irish Central, 2013). The way that Robinson reconciles her personal political views, 
career in public service, and personal religious identity sheds light on the presence of 
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devout liberal Catholics whose personal spirituality bolsters their individual political 
beliefs, even when The Church decrees a different teaching.  
Future research should further interrogate the presence and magnitude of liberal 
Catholics, including those who are nominal in their personal religiosity as well as those 
who use a spiritual lens to frame their liberal views. This context regarding the presence 
of liberal Catholics in the Republic is particularly relevant as it relates to the collection of 
future survey data in the country. As my study demonstrates, the presence of nominal 
Catholics in the “Catholic” pool can cause confusing results without context regarding 
the salience of religiosity in the Republic. Future quantitative research should consider 
using religiosity indicators to group Catholics in the Republic from the outset. Parsing out 
devout and nominal Catholics in this way would allow liberal Catholicism in the 
Republic to be better understood and analyzed in future studies.  
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
 To summarize, quantitative analysis of ISSP data reveals that religious identity and 
personal religiosity are both salient in Northern Ireland. Further, over time, the religiously 
unaffiliated have become their own distinct group within this ethnoreligious framework in the 
North. Meanwhile, religiosity is most salient in the Republic of Ireland. The lack of distinction 
between the religious nones and Catholics in the multivariate analysis suggests the presence of 
nominal Catholics in the Republic who hold liberal social beliefs, breaking from the Church’s 
teachings on abortion, same-sex relationships, and gender roles. Additionally, qualitative case 
studies pertaining to each trend provide evidence, albeit limited, that each trend uncovered by my 
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quantitative analysis has persisted in modern day debates around abortion and same-sex 
marriage.  
 
Limitations and Potential for Future Research 
I hope this project meaningfully speaks to the unique ways that religion and national 
context intersect to shape public opinion on issues related to gender. While I am proud of this 
work which builds on larger bodies of research related to the intersection of gender, politics, and 
religion, there are limitations to this piece that should inform future research endeavors. Some of 
these limitations are due, in part, by the COVID-19 pandemic which limited my ability to 
incorporate interviews into my research design and impacted the structure of my qualitative 
analysis.21 
First, Northern Ireland was not included in the 2018 ISSP Religion survey, which limited 
my ability to track quantitative trends to modern day. Future research could apply my 
quantitative methods to 2018 ISSP religion data from Ireland to determine if and how the trends 
evidenced here have changed in the decade since 2008. I would also like to see future research 
build gender, race, sexuality, and class identities into the multivariate model to construct a more 
intersectional analysis. As Ireland continues to diversify both racially and religiously, the 
intersections of these identities will become an even more pressing topic of study. Specifically, 
future research should interrogate the ways that the intersection of race, religion, and gender 
might matter differently for men and women.  
                                               
21 More generally, the COVID-19 pandemic has significantly changed the face of research today. For instance, this 
entire thesis project was conducted during COVID-times, which necessitated fully virtual meetings with my advisor, 
research methods that could be conducted remotely, and a hybrid defense format.  
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I also believe the qualitative portion of this project leaves ample opportunity for growth 
in future research. Here, I have provided limited case studies pertaining to each trend evidenced 
in my statistical analysis. Moving forward, a representative sample of elite rhetoric from multiple 
traditions could be studied through a more rigorous and systematized content analysis. I find it 
interesting that, when conducting the qualitative analysis, I struggled to find sources related to 
gender roles in family. Most public statements from religious and political leaders are specific to 
more contentious issues that can be directly legislated. I believe that interviews could bridge the 
gap between the quantitative findings about gender roles and the lack of qualitative material on 
the topic on both sides of the border. In addition, my research points to multiple groups which 
are seemingly understudied in the Irish context, such as liberal Catholics in the Republic and the 
religiously unaffiliated. Because these groups often mobilize outside of religious settings, 
interviews could also prove useful in better understanding these communities in future studies.   
 After finishing this project, I am also left curious about the disconnect between everyday 
religious folks and religious elites as it relates to social issues. Future research should expand on 
both the substance of these divisions and the reasons behind such divides. I believe interviews 
with everyday individuals and religious elites could prove valuable in uncovering the disconnect 
on various gendered church teachings. Throughout the qualitative portion of this piece, I found 
records of interviews with religious elites to be particularly helpful in understanding the divide 
between elite rhetoric and the political mobilization of everyday people, which often contradicts 
church teaching. For these reasons, I encourage future researchers to pursue interviews on these 
topics when in-person research methods are more able to comfortably and safely resume.  
 Now that progress has been made on abortion and same-sex marriage on both sides of the 
border, future researcher must consider which social issues will be most salient moving forward 
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and how these issues should be studied. In my view, researchers should keep an eye on 
transgender and gender-inclusive movements on both sides of the border, as issues relevant to 
these communities have been absent from the more widespread push for same-sex marriage. 
Public opinion survey organizations, such as ISSP, should begin to consider how attitudes on 
these issues could be measured in upcoming surveys. Specific to the Irish context, researchers 
should also keep an eye on the potential upcoming referendum to amend constitutional language 
on gender roles in the Republic. If this referendum were to occur, more qualitative material from 
religious elites on gender roles would likely surface.   
More generally, this project demonstrates that religion impacts public opinion in unique 
ways depending on the national context. I hope that this finding informs future research 
regarding possible theories of religious impact. The findings of my project indicate that there is 
likely not one correct answer when it comes to theorizing the impact of religion on public 
opinion. I believe that the findings of this study could translate to broader conversations 
surrounding religion and social values, such as the liberalization of abortion policy in Argentina 
or the continued disputes about religious exemptions for same-sex unions in the United States. 
Additionally, my work has identified the religiously unaffiliated as an important player in the 
Irish political arena. In my view, this is an understudied topic in the Irish context and ripe for 
future research. Future work should track the growth of the religiously unaffiliated and their 
political salience in future debates of social importance on both sides of the border.   
As I wrap up this project, I look back on the lived experiences that first motivated my 
interest in gender, sexuality, and religion. I realize now that, despite my own devout religious 
background, I have viewed the role of religion in shaping gendered social values with a lot of 
 56 
contempt. I have seen firsthand the hurt that can be caused when socially conservative, religious 
values are forced on others.   
In light of these personal experiences and frustrations, the story of social progress on both 
sides of the Irish border has been inspiring to study. Moving forward, more people will have to 
reconcile the role of religion in society and politics, especially as many societies undergo social 
progress. In my view, those of us who firmly believe in equal rights and social progress have two 
choices. We can leave the Church and join the rapidly growing community of the religiously 
unaffiliated. Alternatively, we can stay within our religious communities and help create spaces 
where progressive social values and religious beliefs are not at fundamental odds. As for me, I 
haven’t yet decided which path I will choose; however, I am thankful and proud to have 
undertaken a project that leaves me with more questions to explore as I move on from my time at 
the University of Louisville. 
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APPENDIX 1   
 
2008 QUESTIONNAIRE    
 
Dependent Variable Questions  
 
Same sex relationships 
And what about sexual relations between two adults of the same sex, is it… 
• Always wrong (1) 
• Almost always wrong (2) 
• Wrong only sometimes (3) 
• Not wrong at all (4) 
• Can’t choose (8) 
 
Abortion  
Do you personally think it is wrong or not wrong for a woman to have an abortion?  
a). If there is a strong chance of serious defect in the baby?  
b). If the family has a very low income and cannot afford any more children 
• Always wrong 
• Almost always wrong 
• Wrong only sometimes 
• Not wrong at all 
• Can’t choose 
 
Gender Roles 
Do you agree or disagree…  
A husband’s job is to earn money; a wife’s job is to look after the home and family. 
• Strongly agree 
• Agree 
• Neither Agree nor Disagree 
• Disagree 
• Strongly Disagree 
• Can’t choose 
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Independent Variable Questions 
Feelings about the Bible 
Which of these statements comes closest to describing your feelings about the Bible? 
• The Bible is the actual word of God and it is to be taken literally, word for word 
• The Bible is the inspired word of God, but not everything should be taken literally, word 
for word 
• The Bible is an ancient book of fables, legends, history, and moral precepts recorded by 
man 
• This does not apply to me 
• Can’t choose 
Religious attendance 
28. How often do you take part in the activities or organizations of 
a church or place of worship other than attending services? 
Never 
Less than once a year. 
About once or twice a year 
Several times a year 
About once a month 
2-3 times a month 
Nearly every week 
Every week 
Several times a week  
 
Self-Reported Religiosity 
Would you describe yourself as…  
• Extremely religious 
• Very religious 
• Somewhat religious 
• Neither religious nor non-religious 
• Somewhat non-religious 
• Very non-religious 
• Extremely non-religious 






APPENDIX 1 (cont.) 
1991 QUESTIONNAIRE 
Dependent Variable Questions  
 
Same sex relationships 
And what about sexual relations between two adults of the same sex, is it…    
• Always wrong 
• Almost always wrong 
• Wrong only sometimes 
• Not wrong at all 
• Can’t choose 
 
Abortion 
Do you think the law should or should not allow a woman to obtain a legal abortion…  
a). If there is a strong chance of a serious defect in the baby?  
b). If the family has a very low income and cannot afford any more children?  
• Definitely should allow it 
• Probably should allow it 
• Probably should not allow it 
• Definitely should not allow it 
• Can’t choose 
            
Independent Variable Questions 
Feelings about the Bible 
Which one of these statements comes closest to describing your feelings about the Bible?  
• The Bible is the actual word of God and it is to be taken literally, word for word 
• The Bible is the inspired word of God but not everything should be taken literally, word 
for word 
• The Bible is an ancient book of fables, legends, history, and moral teachings recorded by 
man 
• This does not apply to me 





Now, thinking about the present, how often do you attend religious services?  
• Never 
• Less than once a year 
• About once or twice a year 
• Several times a year 
• About once a month 
• 2-3 times a month 
• Nearly every week 
• Every week 
• Several times a week 
 
Self-Reported Religiosity 
Would you describe yourself as…  
• Extremely religious 
• Very religious 
• Somewhat religious 
• Neither religious nor non-religious 
• Somewhat non-religious 
• Very non-religious 
• Extremely non-religious 
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